

Review of INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

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CONTRIBUTION TO PEACE

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Tito in India

TODAY the „Galeb” will cast anchor in the waters of Bombay and President Tito with his party will land on the soil of friendly India — the distant country of the monsoons, the country of Gandhi and Nehru. Until yesterday almost unknown to each other, separated by many seas and lands, in two different corners of the world, India and Yugoslavia were separated from each other in all respects by as many kilometres as lay between them if we speak in terms of space: not a metre nearer. Today that remote country will welcome Tito as a dear guest, an old acquaintance and, on many occasions, a comrade in a common struggle. President Tito will thank India for welcoming him with sincere and cordial words of the deepest friendship. This will not surprise anybody, and nobody will ask how and why India and Yugoslavia have met — all will accept this meeting as a meeting of old friends and acquaintances. What is this force that succeeded in bridging the distances which separated a small country in Europe and a big country in Asia?

Before the Second World War, Yugoslavia was only a geographic concept, a small and unknown country in the Balkans. In international affairs her voice was not heard, nor did anyone value her opinion. She was an instrument of the big power politics and, thanks to the men who were her leaders at that time, she could only be a satellite of one great power one day and of another one the following day. The ruling sets of incompetent and primitive politicians who came into power thanks to lesser or greater support from abroad, consistent in the betrayal of national interests, auctioned off the considerable natural resources of the country, and reduced the homeland of a

people with rich militant, political and other traditions to the level of a semi-colonial country. When the invader knocked at her door, it opened of itself, and in a few days Yugoslavia ceased to exist on the geographic map of Europe.

These lines sound like an account from the distant past, but only a decade has elapsed since another Yugoslavia started to live and exist — new in her freedom and independence, in her strength and international prestige. Today all peoples of the world know about this new Yugoslavia. Statesmen and politicians of all the continents value and respect her views on the great problems of our time. She has become a factor of international policy in the fullest sense of the word, and today even the greatest powers in the world behave towards her as a partner worthy of respect who knows what he wants and what he can, who has his own views and principles, who is nobody's satellite, but wants to be a friend to all nations. The road followed by Yugoslavia while she changed from a mere instrument into a factor in international policy is linked with Tito's name and Tito's achievements. That is why President Tito is considered today one of the greatest men of our time: one of those statesmen who will go down in the history of this century — a century of great and decisive events in the life of the international community. Yugoslavia is not a big country, nor a big power. She has neither the atom nor the hydrogen bomb, nor bases in various parts of the world. Her economic power is not such as to be the source of any kind of superiority. What is more, Yugoslavia is a small country both in size and in population. The reasons for her influence and popularity, the reasons for the role of President Tito, are to be sought in her pioneer task of building up a socialist democracy, and in her energetic policy of struggle for peace and equality among nations.

This is the magic force which placed Yugoslavia in the forefront of international events and linked her with all countries and individuals who cherish the same ideals of freedom and independence and who see in the peaceful coexistence of nations and in economic progress the sine qua non for the prosperity of the international community. This is the magic force which succeeded in bridging the distances which until recently separated Yugoslavia and India — the small Balkan country and the large Asian sub-continent.

Today the „Galeb” will cast anchor in the port of Bombay and salvoes from Indian warships will greet the first head of a European State to visit the free and independent Republic of India. Until yesterday checked by fetters of colonial dependence, economically under-developed and backward, India succeeded in a few years in becoming a factor of first-class international significance. Not because she might have the atom or the H-bomb and not because she is large in terms of square kilometres and in terms of population. She is actually great and important because from the first day of her independence, she became a constant champion of cooperation between nations and of the right of every country to be the master of its own fate. Her leader, Nehru, a man of great spirit and nobility, great as a fighter and as a politician, passionate advocate of non-violence and coexistence, has become one of the eminent political figures of today. His name, — just like Tito's — is a synonym of the struggle for those ideals which are the synthesis of the most humanitarian values of the free spirit of man.

The difference between India and Yugoslavia — the country with about 400 million inhabitants and the country with less than 20 million inhabitants — is doubtless wide. Each country has its own distinct problems, and the paths of their internal development, although with essentially similar aims, are not identical. And yet, all the barriers which might separate them are insignificant when compared with their common ideals and interests. Against backwardness and poverty — for a social system in which there will be no oppression and exploitation; against the everlasting division of the world into developed and under-developed countries — for the economic prosperity of all nations; against the policy of blocs and spheres of influence — for equality and cooperation of all countries; against the policy of war and political, ideological, racial and religious exclusiveness — for active and peaceful coexistence. This is the platform on which India and Yu-

Yugoslavia have met in order to strengthen friendship which could not have found more solid and lasting foundations. The words of President Tito that the views of Yugoslavia and India on the problems of international cooperation are identical, and the words of Premier Nehru that he fully agrees with Yugoslavia's attitude towards important questions of foreign policy, only confirmed the great truth that there can be no differences or contradictions between countries which unselfishly strive for peace.

Some people in the world have been asking recently whether Tito and Nehru are upholders of neutralism and whether they are trying to create a third force. These people may be well-intentioned but their sincerity in this regard cannot justify their poor knowledge of current international conditions, particularly of the political practice of Yugoslavia and India. Both countries share the view that neutralism is an obsolete theory which failed to prevent the realization of aggressive plans in the past and failed to ensure a peaceful existence for the countries which were its protagonists. The so-called neutral countries were as a rule the easiest prey for the aggressor. If some of them succeeded in remaining outside world conflicts, they have to thank their geographic situation rather than their neutrality, for it. Today in the era of the H-bomb when the survival of the entire human community is at stake — neutralism would not only be unable to prevent the outbreak of a new conflict, but could not even safeguard anyone's existence, as H-bombs and radioactive rays recognize no frontiers. Peace has become indivisible for the first time in history, and the dilemma for or against the atomic war is no longer the dilemma of one side only, but the vital problem of all countries on our planet. The active way in which Yugoslavia and India are engaged in the struggle for peace is the most eloquent negation of the concept of neutralism.

The idea of a third force as a bloc of neutral countries which would be the regulator of balance between the two antagonistic camps, suffers from the same incurable ills. Impossible in the present international situation, the idea of a third force directly clashes with the conception of both Yugoslavia and India that the division of the world into blocs is a potential source of danger for peace and coexistence, and that the solution should not be sought in the maintenance of a balance of blocs, but in the liquidation of blocs and their policy of antagonism. The third force is therefore an unrealistic conception which adopts and sanctions the existing division of the world.

To build the future of the world (as this, without exaggeration, is actually involved) on the unrealistic ground of classical neutralism and a third force, would be as inadvisable (and dangerous) as the adoption of the conception of armed coexistence. Two blocs which, armed to the teeth with conventional and hydrogen weapons, are to exist side by side only because at that time one is not stronger and the other is not weaker, are not a strong

basis for a lasting coexistence. The armed balance of forces has indeed produced the basic condition for coexistence of blocs, but this is only a starting point and not an objective. The ways of genuine coexistence which shall not only constitute a coexisting of blocs whom the possession of atomic secrets has placed in a stalemate position, should be sought elsewhere and they must not be viewed through the prism of the cold war which emphasizes arms and arms only.

Tito and Nehru are advocating an active coexistence which is to destroy the heritage of the cold war and create, through good will and reasonable concessions, the possibilities for a genuine and all-round international cooperation. This cooperation in all spheres of human activity, and the exertion of efforts to preserve peace, will be the most effective for a gradual limiting and neutralizing of those contradictions which today divide the world in two. The establishment of mutual confidence would lead to the creation of a world in which mutual respect and tolerance should replace suspicion and intolerance, while violence would be rejected as a method for settling international problems. This process of active coexistence would not develop without difficulties. The heritage of distrust is too great. But, all these difficulties would be easily overcome if enough good will were to be found on all sides and if all were prepared to fulfil their task. The most suitable mechanism for the unification of efforts in this direction would be the United Nations Organization. With its Charter, the principles of which are objectively acceptable for all countries which see in aggression the cause of all the miseries and misfortunes of this century, with the organs and institutions whose effectiveness in the settlement of disputes and the seeking of practical possibilities for general cooperation is only now to obtain expression — the United Nations Organization would become an authoritative instrument of creative coexistence.

All this will be the subject of talks between the two great statesmen of our time. Hence their meeting will dispel many prejudices and clear many ideas, it will give a new impulse to the efforts for ensuring conditions for a lasting coexistence. Tito will also acquaint our friends in India with the Yugoslav experience in the development of socialist democracy, and himself will get acquainted on the spot with the present realities in India, a country new and interesting for us in many respects.

Today the „Galeb” will cast anchor in the Bombay harbour and Tito will land on the soil of India and Asia as a friend and representative of a country which has grasped the exceptional significance of the historical changes taking place in that part of the world, and which watches and greets with unconcealed sympathy the achievements of the Asian peoples, of India and Burma, in the struggle for national independence and for economic, cultural and social emancipation.

Best wishes and a Happy New Year

From the Editorial Staff

of the

„Review of INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS”

OPINIONS ON ACTUAL PROBLEMS

Vlajko BEGOVIC

CONTRIBUTION TO PEACE AND COOPERATION BETWEEN NATIONS

THE FIFTH GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE WORLD VETERANS FEDERATION*

PEACE and cooperation between nations was a subject of lively discussion in the commissions and in the plenary meetings of the Fifth General Assembly of the World Veterans Federation. The primary importance of this basic international question of today gave special significance to the work of the General Assembly. This significance is also evidenced by the fact that 24 heads of state and Prime Ministers, including President Tito, Eisenhower, Churchill and others, the Secretary General of the United Nations, Mr. Hamarskjöld, and leaders of numerous organizations throughout the world have addressed messages and greetings to the General Assembly.

Veterans of the Second World War who fought for peace and national freedom of peoples are today rightly interested in peace, national freedom and cooperation between nations. In his message to the General Assembly of the Federation, Comrade Tito said: „Today, when the whole world knows that a new war would mean suicide, peace must no longer be a remote ideal, but the right of nations who seek it and preserve it. That is why fighters for peace and equality of nations, fighters for peaceful coexistence and for agreed settlement of all outstanding disputes today have the same noble role as the fighters for freedom”.

The General Assembly has fulfilled this noble role. Of course, the adoption of this correct political orientation by the General Assembly was not possible without political struggle. Some veterans' organizations still view international problems in the light of the policy of blocs, ideological intolerance and mistrust, there are still remnants of cold war methods and attempts to maintain an atmosphere of tension. Those veterans' organizations which retain such conceptions came with draft resolutions in which Europe is divided into „free” and „unfree” nations, while the whole world is divided into blocs; with proposals for the creation of individual regional military alliances against aggression threatening only from a definite side; with demands for „political freedoms” and „free elections” under international control in Eastern European countries, etc.

Of course, such policy would not speed up the process of appeasement and easing of the international tension and would not serve peace and cooperation between nations.

The supporters of such policies were in evident minority in the commissions and in the plenary meetings of the General Assembly, and either the majority succeeded in convincing them that their views were incorrect, or they were compelled to withdraw from their positions. The preponderant majority of the General Assembly supported the view that better conditions for the maintenance of peace were being increasingly created,

that all international problems and disputes could be settled by peaceful means, by negotiations and agreements, and that the United Nations organization is a suitable forum for the settlement of these disputes. Furthermore, the opinion has been expressed that in such a situation it is necessary to develop in an ever increasing measure the political, economic, cultural and other forms of cooperation between nations, without interfering in their internal affairs and in respecting the freedom and independence of each country. In this way it will be possible to widen cooperation and achieve the „rapprochement” of countries inside individual areas, in the whole of Europe and the world. Under such conditions it will be possible to develop coexistence between various countries along the lines of an ever wider cooperation, mutual confidence and tolerance of ideological differences.

In this sense the General Assembly adopted a resolution for the strengthening of peace and cooperation between nations, for the right of peoples to their national freedom and independence, for human rights throughout the world, for technical and financial assistance to underdeveloped countries, for the control of armaments and their reduction until full disarmament is ultimately achieved and for the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes and the creation of better conditions for the economic development and the standard of living of the peoples, etc. It was specially demanded that occupational forces be withdrawn from Austria as soon as possible and that the question of Austria's independence, as one of the European questions, be solved without delay. These attitudes, set forth in the resolutions, were unanimously adopted at the General Assembly.

Such political orientation and conclusions of the General Assembly of war veterans will fill with gladness all friends of peace and cooperation between nations. On the other hand, it will strengthen the unity of the World Federation. True, considerable efforts had to be made for the achievement of this political orientation. In this activity the Yugoslav delegation exerted all its efforts and on this basis developed its cooperation with the other national delegations, especially with the delegations of European countries.

* The World Veterans Federation includes over 120 organizations with more than 20 million members from 20 countries on all the continents. Its basic aims are: struggle for peace and national freedom of nations, cooperation among war veterans in various countries, protection of the interests of veterans and aid to the war disabled and other victims of war with a view to rehabilitation.

The present programme of work and political orientation of the World Veterans Federation provide a very wide platform for cooperation and unification of all national organizations of world veterans. This creates the possibility for making the World Federation a universal organization of war veterans.

The General Assembly of the World Veterans Federation has shown that in the present situation, the forces

which declare themselves for peace and active cooperation among nations are on the increase and that the policy of blocs and ideological intolerance is losing ground. It becomes more and more obvious that the world is faced with the following alternative: either peace and mutual cooperation of nations, or mutual destruction. The World Veterans Federation has clearly taken the side of peace and cooperation between nations.

Aleksandar JELIĆ

Counsellor in the State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs

FINANCIAL NEGOTIATIONS IN BELGRADE

A SERIES of mutual economic and financial obligations have to be settled between Yugoslavia and Italy. Some of these obligations date back to the pre-war relations, others have derived from the Peace Treaty, while certain obligations result from the Yugoslav measures for the nationalization of Italian property, or from the liquidation of Italian credit institutions in the area which was incorporated into Yugoslavia under the Peace Treaty.

One of the most important Italian obligations is the obligation concerning the payment of reparations and the obligation to pay pensions and social insurance benefits to the inhabitants of the incorporated areas. The most important Yugoslav obligation concerns the payment of compensation for nationalized Italian property in the incorporated areas, and the transfer of accounts belonging to persons who have chosen Italy. In a number of unsettled questions such as liquidation of clearing balances, which existed before the resumption of monetary relations and the liquidation of the situation created by the exchange of banknotes, both sides considered they had claims on these counts. With the exception of reparations, of which the amount and method of payment were determined by the Peace Treaty, it was necessary in all the other matters, to establish the amount of the obligations or claims, and in some cases, who was the creditor and who was the debtor. Furthermore, all this depended on the settlement of a series of legal problems, so that each of these questions was particularly complicated.

During the talks which were conducted in Rome in 1949 and 1950, none of these questions could be definitely settled. Finally the agreement of December 23, 1950 provided that Italy was to make an advance payment of something over 30 million dollars for reparations, and of 2 million dollars on account for pensions while Yugoslavia was to advance 16 million dollars for compensation of nationalized Italian assets. A list was drawn up containing twenty questions which, together with the question of reparations remained pending and it was decided that no payments should be made under any of these items until they had all been definitely settled and until mutual debts and claims arising under them had been cleared so that possibly only a single balance would have to be paid in the final instance.

The settlement of the questions concerning the compensation for nationalized Italian property called for extensive preliminary technical work. About 16,000 former Italian owners in the incorporated area applied for compensation for property which was in the incorporated territory. It was necessary to look into each individual case, establish the legal position of each estate separately, the components of that property and the elements indispensable to determine its value. A mixed commission was formed to that effect as early as 1949. Although this commission has not yet fully completed its task, its work has progressed so much that Governments have now sufficient elements to settle this question. Nevertheless the fact that the mixed commission has not yet completed

its task has prevented Yugoslavia and Italy to reach a final settlement for the questions left pending.

However, after the signature of the Memorandum of Understanding on the question of Trieste between the two Governments, a new atmosphere was created which was more favorable for an early settlement of all pending questions. That is why, immediately after the Memorandum was made public, the two Governments decided to settle as soon as possible the unsolved questions enumerated in the so-called Rome agreement of December 23, 1950, and to determine the balance of all the mutual claims and debts arising under them.

Delegations of the two Governments started negotiations in Belgrade in mid-November. Although they entertained opposite legal conceptions on a large number of questions, they nonetheless succeeded in a very short time, so far as we know, in finding for nearly all these questions solutions acceptable for both sides. This was possible thanks to the mutual understanding of the two Governments, and especially to their wish to remove as soon and as thoroughly as possible all those problems which have been inherited from the past, and might disturb the friendly atmosphere prevailing today. It seems that so far all questions have been settled, except the question of the so-called "free property" belonging to persons who have chosen Italy — which prevented the signing of an agreement in the anticipated time.

The real estate owned in the incorporated area by persons who chose Italy, was not nationalized. During the talks conducted in 1950 the Italian Government proposed that the Yugoslav Government purchase this property. The Yugoslav Government accepted the proposal and undertook to buy those free estates which their owners should offer for sale in the prescribed period. Finally, the Italian Government, acting on behalf of all the owners concerned offered the Yugoslav Government in the prescribed time, to buy back all their property.

In the course of these negotiations, the Yugoslav delegation has expressed the opinion that these estates should also be included in the general compensation and considered as having been bought back. However, the Italian delegation has pointed out that it had no authorization to offer for sale the property of a certain number of these owners and so that it considered that such property should remain free even after the conclusion of the agreement (although the said agreement would also provide for the payment of such property).

The Yugoslav delegation could not accept this view of the Italian delegation but, in order to avoid a stalemate proposed a compromise solution which enables the Italian delegation to secure subsequently the necessary authorization from the owners who have not given it so far. It is expected that the Italian Government will accept this compromise proposal and that it will be possible to sign the agreement without delay, so as to avoid a situation in which the unsettled problems inherited from the past might hamper the forthcoming settlement of the economic relations between the two countries.

THE GERMAN DILEMMA

NO European issue can today be considered without taking into account the very important and complex German problem, which exerts considerable influence on the shaping of inter-European relations. And since inter-European relations directly influence the international situation, the German problem is not only a European problem, but also one of those issues over which opinions widely differ and which concerns the peace and security, not only of Europe, but of the whole international community.

In the post-war period Germany has become an area where the adverse tendencies and conceptions of the two leading world powers and their allies come into conflict. Both sides, the East and the West, are more or less inclined to view the German problem through the prism of their own foreign political interests, and to give priority to those solutions which, in the more general field of bloc politics, would give them a greater advantage in their struggle against one another.

Thus, Germany has come into an unenviable situation. The division of Europe means her own division. Since 1949 there have been two German States, both of which refuse to recognize the other. What is worse, they are both trying to become the model for a future united Germany. Moreover, they are linked with the existing blocs — one with the East and the other with the West — which endeavour to control and exploit their resources in men and material.

These tendencies of the opposing blocs clash with the natural wish of most Germans — the peaceful unification of their country, which is their chief national interest. Though German unification depends on the agreement of the two blocs, which in turn depends on the balance of power between them, the events occurred in recent years give the impression that both the East and the West intend to stabilize the existing division of Germany rather than create conditions for her unification. The two German Governments, as well as the occupying powers, have long declared the country's unification to be their primary aim. But though they are in agreement as to the necessity for unification, they differ on the methods for achieving it. In this conflict bloc politics come to full expression, and each side would like to secure the support of the whole of Germany for itself.

The Western Powers, faced with recent aggressive threats from the other side, emphasized the necessity of including the Federal Republic into their own defence system as soon as possible and of rearming her, but maintaining in this respect a control on which France particularly insisted. Thus the country's unification was pushed into the background. It was desirable for the Western Powers only if it eliminated Soviet influence from Germany — the proposed free elections were to contribute to this aim — and brought about her integration into the Western bloc, that is, into the defensive and political community of Western Europe.

In the time of the Stalinist foreign policy, the Soviet Union's chief aim was to take advantage of its positions in Eastern Germany so as to expand its influence further towards the West and prevent the remilitarization of Western Germany; to which it subordinated the question of the unification of the German people. In the new situation since changes have occurred in its foreign policy, the Soviet Union is doing its best to prevent the rearming of Western Germany within the Western bloc, accepting in principle the proposed free elections as the first phase of the country's unification, at the same time attempting to build up a system of general European security.

Considered from the German point of view, the country's unification would raise the problem of the future of the regimes now in existence in the two distinct German States. The West German system has had so far a better chance of survival, not only because the Western part of the country is stronger in men and material, but because it is more attractive to the people. But here the differences

between the Government Coalition and the Social-Democratic Opposition must be taken into account. These differences were most clearly manifested in the Government's refusal to recognize the Pankow Government and in its demand for a definite unification procedure: first elections, then a single all-German Government, which would be free in all foreign political matters. At first the East Germans came forward with a counter-proposal (first the creation of all-German organs on the parity basis, and then elections), and then gradually made concessions in accepting to give priority to free elections. This, however, does not mean that they would not insist on their conception of the organization of the elections which is quite different from the Bonn idea.

But together with the duel of notes and conceptions that went on in the last few years, as regards reunification, the actual process of integration of the two German States into the Western and the Eastern blocs respectively, has evolved.

The Federal Republic has established closer relations with the United States and Western Europe. After the failure of the EDC plan, there came the Paris Conference and the decision that Western Germany should join NATO and the Brussels Pact, the agreement on the control of German armaments and the temporary solution of the Saar dispute. Eastern Germany, which began to consolidate its position after the serious events of June 17 last year, is now an important force in the East European group. This became evident at the Moscow Conference, when it was announced that in case the Paris Agreements are ratified, the East European countries would organize their joint armed forces and that the Eastern Germany would build up an army of her own, (which already exists under the guise of strong police forces).

This seems to show that the old line of bloc politics is still being followed, and that the unification of Germany is still subordinated to the interests of the two blocs.

While the West is ready to talk with the East after the Paris Agreements have been ratified (France supports the view that talks can start even before that), the East is energetic in saying that there will be no German unification if the Agreements are ratified. But this does not mean that talks, on other matters may not take place, but it is sure that it would lead, at least temporarily, to the armed coexistence of the two German states, which would prolong the division of Germany and create the danger of forcible unification.

However, although the prospects for German unification in the near future are not at all bright, there are many new elements which might help to reconcile the views of the opposing sides. Firstly, there has been an improvement in the international situation and an abatement in the cold war. Secondly, steps have been taken towards the solving of a number of moot issues. All this gives the impression that other more complex problems, such as German unification, will be tackled too. We may also say that a change for the better has taken place in the attitude of the opposing blocs. The Soviet Union, for instance, has accepted the principle of free elections. This, however, does not solve the delicate problem of their implementation, the more so as the East German Government claims its recent elections as an example of all German free elections, which is denied by both the Government and the Opposition in Western Germany. Other things that increase our hope are the recognition of Germany's right to sovereignty and to maintain a national army for defensive purposes which would not threaten the security of other European nations and the fact that Europe really needs a broad system of collective security, which would go further than the mere coexistence of armed blocs.

It is characteristic that neither side wishes to shut the doors on future talks, and that they intend to approve, under certain conditions, the implementation of the proposed measures for military integration. These are the

symptoms which show that German unification is not a hopeless project, although the present state of affairs might produce undesirable consequences, i. e. new tension, further postponement of German unification, if the two German States are stabilized — that is, if there would be, instead of reunification, the coexistence of the Federal and the People's Republics, with armies included in adverse military and political blocs, the character of which would become secret. That would be an unnatural situation, and, therefore, a source of many disagreements and conflicts.

It seems that in Western Germany the necessity for unification, which is of interest not only to the Germans but to the whole of Europe, becomes more and more actual. The Coalition Government is rather divided over the Paris Agreement, — primarily because of the arrangement concluded in connection with the Saar problem — and is in no hurry to ratify them. Adenauer's party defends the Agreements as the best way towards the re-unification of the country, while the Social-Democratic Opposition continues its offensive against the Government and the said Agreements refusing, as in the past, to accept any integration of the Federal Republic into the Western bloc before another attempt is made to reach a four power agreement on Germany.

The Opposition considers that conditions for the convening and success of a four power conference are now better than at the time of the Berlin conference. There are some politicians in Bonn, who, although they ignore the Pankow Government admit the possibility of a single all

German Parliament including representatives of the United Socialist Party, and abandon the idea of a „liberation“ of Eastern Germany, which the Soviet Union would certainly not allow.

For the time being the question of German unification is still the concern of the four occupying powers, which seem to be in a greater hurry to stabilize their blocs than to reach agreement on the unification of Germany which they consider within the framework of a number of other security problems. They view things through their own conceptions of the organization of the security system, which do not take sufficiently into account the interests and needs of Europe as a whole. The West would like to see the Russians show more good will in practice, for instance, in concluding the long overdue Austrian peace treaty. The East tries to prevent the Western system from being reinforced through the inclusion of German divisions and offers talks but not the concessions which the West demands.

True, the problem of Germany's unification cannot be settled separately from the problem of European security. Experience has taught us that bloc politics cannot be very effective as methods, and history has shown that Europe has been in a tragic situation whenever the German national tasks were carried out by nationalist and militarist forces. A peaceful German unification, such as is necessary to the Germans and to Europe, can be achieved only through patient and rational talks, providing that no bloc interests play any part in them.

L. ERVEN

NORTH-ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

A GENERAL STUDY OF THE ORIGIN, STRUCTURE AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE NATO

III

THE IDEOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE ATLANTIC PACT

THE Atlantic Pact Treaty contains some provisions under which its defensive policy, as well as other forms of international cooperation it provides for, are set into definite patterns and determined by definite motives of an ideological character. „The Contracting Parties“, reads the preamble to the Treaty, „are resolved to preserve their people's freedom, common heritage and civilization, which are based on the principles of democracy, individual liberties and the rule of law“. Under Article 2, they are to develop peaceful international relations by „strengthening their free institutions and by encouraging a better understanding of the principles upon which they rest“. Under Article 10, the Treaty may be joined by any other European State, which, in addition to other requirements, can contribute to promoting the principles of the Treaty.

According to these provisions the Atlantic Pact is an international organization which comprises States of a definite political and social type, and which has for its aim the protecting, strengthening and expansion of a definite social order — in addition to the furtherance of other forms of international cooperation in stabilizing peace and in developing political and economic relations. Such provisions give the organization the character of an ideological bloc.

All the social and political conceptions formulated in the said provisions — freedom, democracy, civilization, individual liberties, free institutions and the rule of law — have been taken in an abstract sense and do not mean any definite content or quality, since the content of such conceptions is subject to evolution in social development. States with different political and social systems strive to

achieve freedom, democracy and the emancipation of men and social institutions, but they are not all in agreement as to the forms of social order which contribute most to the attainment of these ends. The concrete content of these conceptions is dependent on the social doctrine or order which they uphold. Therefore, in interpreting their meaning within the framework of the Atlantic Pact Treaty, which is the sole concern of this article, one must take into account the conceptions of the Atlantic Powers, which are the result of the ideological similarity of their social systems. Although there are great and essential differences in their internal political and social organization, the social orders existing in all the Atlantic Powers fall within the same category — bourgeois political democracy and capitalist economy. Accordingly, freedom, democracy, free institutions, individual liberties, and the rule of law, which the Atlantic Powers are to defend, strengthen and expand by individual and joint efforts, should be taken to represent the social order which now exists in the Western hemisphere.

Though the aim of this article is not to discuss that problem, since it is concerned with the interpretation of a definite treaty, it must, nevertheless, be said that such conceptions of moral, political and ethical values, which the Atlantic Pact Powers put under their protection, are undoubtedly of an absolute character, because they reduce general ideological formulae to their concrete and practical realization such as they themselves understand it and because they conceal the defence of a definite social order by a struggle for general moral values, which that order has not monopolized, and which, after all, are not achieved to the same extent in all the Atlantic Powers themselves.

The ideological aim of the Atlantic Pact should not therefore be taken — as it is often said in its propaganda

— to be the defence and the strengthening of the said principles as absolute and objective categories, but the protection of a definite social order, such as it exists in practice.

Individual members of the Atlantic Pact took the similarity of their ideological conceptions to be much closer and narrower than the similarity of their political and social orders. When, for instance, Turkey's admission to the Pact was contemplated, some Scandinavian countries, which opposed that step for a long time, came forward with the argument that Turkey cannot be allowed to join the Pact because she does not share the common heritage of the States with Christian culture.

The Atlantic Pact, therefore, was not only conceived as a military-defensive alliance of a special kind, but also as an international political and ideological coalition for the defence and stabilization of a definite social order.

The legal aspect of the said provisions of the Atlantic Pact Treaty, particularly of Article 2, was widely discussed during the process of its ratification by member states. We believe it will be of interest to mention here the views which were expressed in this respect in the American Senate. These provisions were not considered as contractual obligations, and member states were not expected to undertake any corresponding steps in their national legislation. The American Secretary of State, Acheson, stated in the Senate that Article 2 was the „ethical essence“ of the Treaty, and that it imposed no obligation on the members. In the report of the Senate Committee, Article 2 was said to be a reaffirmation of faith, which does not provide for any joint organs or measures.

Senator Vandenberg said that these provisions were an „ideological declaration“.

This attitude of the American Senate, which, we believe, coincided with the attitude of other members, was logical and reasonably cautious. For the views of individual members of the Pact on the essence and scope of the principles of freedom, democracy and individual liberties are so different, and their implementation in home countries and overseas possessions so unequal, that a joint Atlantic Pact policy in this field would be impossible, and would — if established — lead to serious misunderstandings. But, since the said provisions of the Treaty are only declarative principles, such a danger does not exist.

Two other characteristic views were expressed on these provisions. In a report of the French committee which considered the Atlantic Pact Treaty, it was said that Article 2, by encouraging public understanding of the principles of free institutions, pointed to the existence of an ideological war against such institutions, and underlined the non-military aspects of the Pact. Moreover, what the American Senate understood by the „common heritage of the peoples of the Atlantic Community“ may be concluded from a resolution noting that the Senate, by unanimously supporting the Pact contributes to the promotion of the most treasured heritage of the nation (which is common to all signatories to the Pact) „the belief that we are in the hands of the Almighty God and that he rules over the affairs of men and nations.“

The provisions based on principles of a political and social character, which formulate the ideological attitude of the Atlantic Pact, are, accordingly, a declaration of faith in the said principles and a manifestation of readiness to defend them. Most of these principles are to be found in the preamble to the Treaty, together with other motives and formal declarations, and not in the operative part of the Treaty, which contains concrete contractual obligations. Article 2 is an exception, but, as we have seen, it does not impose any contractual obligations on the member states. Therefore all the ideological declarations contained in the Treaty are of a propaganda character, which can be explained by the psychosis of that period of the cold war in which the Atlantic Pact came into being, and which was briefly discussed in the first part of this article.

The Atlantic Pact cannot be considered apart from other international combinations in Western Europe, all of which have similar aims and coordinate their activities. In all the treaties of these other combinations similar provisions on the ideological agreement of the signatories and the ideological reasons for their cooperation can also be found. The Brussels Pact (later the West European Union), the Council of Europe and the Organization of European Economic Cooperation have for their aim the protection and strengthening of the social order of their member states.

Similarly, the Atlantic Pact cannot be considered apart from the foreign political moves of one of its important members — the United States, or apart from the political tendencies displayed in the American public and political life. For it is only in the light of these factors, which were responsible for the chief international moves in the Western hemisphere during the cold war, that it is possible to understand more clearly the reason why the above mentioned ideological principles were inserted in the Atlantic Pact Treaty.

The ideological solidarity of the member states, which was so formally proclaimed in the Treaty on defence against aggression, is understood, in addition to propaganda, as a factor which facilitates and justifies the limitation imposed by the Pact regarding the sovereign rights of its members. In the name of solidarity the member states accepted a certain form of integration or close international cooperation, as well as a controlled development in those spheres which are usually considered to be the concern of the home governments. Thus, the Atlantic Pact became, in a sense, not only the instrument of a joint foreign policy, but also an instrument whose action is felt in the domestic policy and particularly in the economy of the member states. The influence of the ideological war has led to conceptions of danger and defence different from those which existed in the previous period of deterioration and tension of the international situation, and the Atlantic Pact sanctions this difference. The danger of aggression, which is a threat to security from without began to be identified with the danger of social changes and revolutions, which are a threat to the existing social and political order, and which can come both from within and from without. The Atlantic Pact was conceived as an association of the States exposed to that double danger, in order to protect their security by building up military defence and to protect their social order by strengthening its members politically and economically. The ideological solidarity based on the principles of western democracy was to be the basis of the efforts to fulfil these tasks.

It must be mentioned that this double task of the Atlantic Pact was not given equal attention by all its members, and that many of them consider the Pact primarily as an instrument of joint defence against aggression, refusing to admit that its ideological character possesses the militant qualities of an instrument of class solidarity and active intolerance in the international field, such as are displayed by some of its members.

Furthermore, as the international situation developed, going through the various phases of the cold war, insistence on the importance of ideological solidarity, which was strongly emphasized at the beginning, began to give way to strategic reasons and requirements.

At the very time of the signing of the Treaty, its political and ideological attitude, emphasized in the preamble and in Article 2, was modified. Both the ideology of the Pact and its North Atlantic character have since undergone considerable changes. Just as its territorial limitation to the North Atlantic region was not an obstruction to the admission into the Pact of States which do not belong to that area, so its ideology, based on the principles of western democracy, did not prevent an authoritarian State like Portugal from joining the Pact. The admission of Portugal to the Pact was not justified by any ideological reasons, but by strategic motives.

The admission of Portugal in the Atlantic Pact shows that, at the very beginning the Pact found itself, because of its ideological attitude on the one hand, and of its principles of regionalism on the other hand, in a difficult situation, both from the point of view of ideology and practical application, and that practical reasons prevailed over principles. This strategic consideration, which at the very birth of the Pact infringed its integrity, was clearly manifested later on, when a broader system of collective security, initiated by the United States, began developing in many other parts of the world, outside the Atlantic Pact. This new system of collective security, it is true, is not closely linked with the Atlantic Pact, but it has, nevertheless, certain ideological links with it, because the Atlantic Pact is considered as part of a general system of security, and because the United States has considerable influence and plays a significant part in both organizations.

The principle of ideological agreement, proclaimed together with the motives and aims of the Atlantic Pact was not respected when the system of collective security was expanded later on.

When the Atlantic Pact was discussed in the American Senate, there were serious proposals concerning the inclusion of Spain. These proposals were motivated by the strategic importance of Spain in the Atlantic defense and justified by the fact that Portugal, also an authoritarian State, had already been admitted into the Pact. It was considered that it was illogical not to include Spain since Portugal, which has a similar authoritarian regime, had been included. These proposals were rejected, but the United States itself solved the matter by concluding a bilateral agreement on military assistance and bases with Spain, thus bringing that country, if not within the framework of the Atlantic Pact, at least into a general system of collective security, which has identical defense purposes.

Spain was not an exceptional case in this respect. In a previous article we have mentioned some states and regions of the Middle and Far East which have also been included into that general system of collective security. And indeed there is no ideological similarity, regardless of the motives of these agreements, in the political and social systems of these States; they do not have a common heritage and civilization, nor identical political and social aspirations.

Zoran ŽUJOVIĆ

NEW PHENOMENA IN THE USSR

THE „Stalin Era” in the life of the Soviet Union has a very definite contents, both in foreign policy practice and in the internal life of the country.

In the economy of the USSR this contents was characterized among other things by severe restrictions in the internal market for consumer's goods. In relation to the great size of the country and to the number of its inhabitants, the USSR, of all the industrial countries, had probably the lowest production and consumption required by the masses of the population, although the Soviet Government, by restricting home consumption, was able to export considerable quantities of grain and other products.

In contrast to this, the basic industry (mining and metallurgy, machine industry, electro-industry etc.) grew at an unprecedented rate, according to the standards of capitalist countries, rising practically out of nothing and raising the Soviet Union from the lowest rung of the ladder to the second place in the world as far as the quantities produced are concerned. During the Second World War and afterwards, this industry was subordinated — especially since the general armament race started — to the needs of war industries. Judging by what the world went through during the last few years, one may conclude that this trend of the Soviet production (supplemented by the subjugated economies of the Eastern European countries) was definitely successful.

Other countries, receiving from this the necessary incentive in this situation — which was also turned to account by those in capitalist countries who are particularly interested in developing war industries — also began to increase their military budgets. The mobilizing of all resources and potentials on this other side as well (which was expressed in the Korean War) soon created a certain balance of forces. And if war has not broken out in the course of the last few years, primarily because of its unpopularity in the world today and of the resistance opposed to such an adventure — a new world war would be even more difficult to start now, simply because it gives no prospects for victory to anyone. The stockpiles of the great powers, full of terrible modern weapons, frighten primarily those who possess them, as their opponent could strike against them with similar weapons.

All this leads to the conclusion that the defensive policy of the West taken both as a whole and on the international plan which was originally proclaimed in the Atlantic Pact Treaty, has undergone considerable changes, and that the criterion of common social and political institutions has been gradually weakening and giving way to a tendency to include all strategically important areas into a general military system.

This means that the military and strategic interests of, at least the, leading powers of the Atlantic Pact have thrown the ideological considerations into the background. This change must have had some influence on the internal characteristics of the Atlantic Pact itself. The proclaimed ideological solidarity of their own social order became a solidarity against the opposing social order; the democratic bloc became an anti-communist bloc; and ultimately, the Western bloc became an anti-Soviet bloc.

In the next article we shall discuss the possibility of a further evolution in the conceptions of the Atlantic Pact Treaty.

The Subsequent Changes

That is why we have, on the one hand, a low living standard in the country, so low that it could lead to unpleasant complications; and on the other hand, the realization that the policy of pressure can no longer be effective and be without consequences which could be very serious today. All this, in addition to other considerations, has compelled the Soviet leadership to revise their own policy.

In the sphere of internal policy and economy, according to certain indications some interesting conclusions were reached while Stalin was still alive. One of these very important conclusions — contrary to the formerly adopted principles — is that the economic laws are as objective as reality itself, which leads to another necessary conclusion, namely: that the laws of development are not formulated in every decree and decision of the Government, but on the contrary, the management of economy must start with the study of objective circumstances and endeavour to find precisely in them ways and means for upholding progressive tendencies.

This — when Stalin's death removed an important barrier to such conceptions — was bound to become one of the first experiences of the Soviet Government. To replace centralized production and distribution, steps were taken to proclaim decentralisation which is to extend to industry, agriculture and trade. It may be asserted already at this early stage that even those measures which the Soviet Government has undertaken so far will considerably influence the increase of production and consequently all that derives from it.

Thus — and this is surely one of the important aims established — strong measures were taken in order to raise the standard of living of the population. The thesis that there can be no building of socialism without a simultaneous improvement of the standard of living is found in the latest articles of Soviet economists, although modestly and cautiously formulated.

Development and Resistance

In brief, every assertion to the effect that important changes are not taking place in the Soviet Union is absolutely without any foundation. The very fact that conditions have ripened to such an extent that changes must occur even in such a conservative and inert group as the upper circle of Soviet society — the centralized apparatus built during several decades with a definite aim — confirms this estimation.

But parallel with this let us leave aside for the time being the wishes and intentions of the highest Soviet leaders; the source of resistance to such a tendency — which is basically progressive, since it leads to essential changes in Soviet society — may, and should normally appear precisely within the state apparatus and the machinery of the various accompanying institutions and organizations. Resistance there is quite natural, since such apparatus was created under different, and in a certain sense contrary, conditions from those prevailing today. It is also natural that resistance should occur there because the apparatus was — and still is — the decisive lever in the economic and administrative management.

At a time of significant changes, this apparatus will probably resist not only because it is not adaptable to changes, and has to be changed itself, but also because the men who are in the State, the party and the economic apparatus are directly and materially interested in the maintenance of the old order and old methods of leadership. In view of the situation in the USSR, the State apparatus represents a significant social force. In this case, this force may appear as a serious check to the changes which have been announced in the past and will be announced in the future.

It would therefore be very incautious, to put it simply, to expect that the internal changes in the USSR will be smoothly carried out, and that the plans of the new Soviet leaders elaborated for one reason or other, will immediately and completely become a determining social force.

What are the Intentions?

The old German ideology states somewhere that men should not be judged on the basis of their declarations but on the basis of their actions. According to this old truth the situation in the Soviet Union is discussed here on the basis of what happened before. There is also another old truth which says that human actions are not directed by men's will but by the conditions which force men to take such actions. Therefore, both the domestic and foreign policy of the Soviet leaders should be viewed in the light of the former statement.

Voices are often heard to the effect that the entire new Soviet policy is a manoeuvre calculated to deceive the foreign and domestic public and that essentially no important changes have occurred. A discussion on this point could be held only on the basis of arguments — which would require a lot of space and time. But with this end in view, another method may be used. Let us assume the following as correct assertion: that after Stalin's death, having reached certain conclusions from a series of failures in the domestic and foreign policy fields, the Soviet Government had decided provisionally to change its method in order to gain time and consolidate the conditions prevailing in the country.

All those who have visited the Soviet Union during the past year or two have observed such occurrences as cannot but point to undeniable changes: the standard of living of the population has been considerably improved, and the tendency to improve it is constant; work on the big projects has been suspended or reduced to a minimum; trade has been decentralized; it is rumoured that criticism will be free, etc.

Such concessions might be very dangerous for those who made them merely as a manoeuvre. They could not be cancelled any more without lots of trouble, or it might even prove impossible. If such a plan has been made only as part of consciously planned tactics, it will inevitably become an objective change which will lead to others, and create a situation which will sooner or later turn directly against these same tactics and their supporters. Consequently we come to the conclusion, regardless of the intentions of the initiator, that what is new in the Soviet Union becomes objectively the material force, which, again,

will speed up the movement in a definite direction, no matter what the people intended and even, if necessary, act against them.

From this it is quite easy to conclude that the new situation in the USSR, viewed as a whole, must be accepted as something that is in line with progress, regardless of the so-called subjective factors.

More about Resistance

Regardless of the indications which point to the changes occurred in Soviet domestic policy (and also in Soviet foreign policy), there are others which remind one of the past. It is a fact, for example, that Stalin's peace in the mausoleum in the Red Square is not disturbed by any particularly abundant slogans about him during the marching by of the processions on May Day and the Seventh of November. It is also a fact that his name is now very rarely mentioned in the press. But it is a fact that the new leaders, while striking at the root of his policy, do not say a word about doing so.

In foreign policy, (we shall take the example of Yugoslavia) such cases are very frequent. Although it is evident that Yugoslavia stands where she stood before, and that the Soviet Union has taken in this respect a big step in a direction contrary to the course followed in Stalin's time — for the present there is no open public statement to that effect.

In other words there is still a strong resistance to the changes which are taking place. This is a resistance in the conscience of the people, the conscience which was created and took root in Stalin's time, and which insists on old methods: methods of centralism in the domestic field and of unequal relations in the foreign policy.

And yet, the basic phenomenon is gradually becoming a reality: the changes exist, although the above mentioned conceptions hamper their realization. In Soviet reality today, these changes have become something which is historically inevitable, which must overcome the recidivism and resistance of the past, no matter how strong they are. It is only a matter of time. Also, when independent countries such as ours are involved it is a question of detecting such point. For the rest, nothing more could be added to the estimations made by the President of the Republic in his speech at Kopar on November 21.

The USSR and Eastern European Countries

Thus we reach the question of foreign policy. The world of today shows interest in Soviet domestic conditions mainly for two reasons; the first is, so to speak, ideological, and the second pertains to foreign policy. Both these forms of interest exist because such changes have a bearing on the essential problems of the modern times. The first interest exists because of the future of socialism in the world, the second — because of the balance of forces and the fate of peace.

One of the most conspicuous measures for the appraisal of Soviet foreign policy is the attitude of this great country towards its Eastern European neighbours. The liquidation of the mixed companies which was recently carried out, has given some hope that this relation too would be subjected to certain changes. The internal changes in these countries — similar to those which are going on in the USSR, carried out simultaneously and on a large scale — seem to encourage these hopes. If these countries were granted their independence, it would be, if not the most important, then at least a very important proof that the progressive tendencies in the Soviet society are beginning to prevail over the resistance mentioned above, and gradually to conquer the key positions. This would mean — considered from the point of view of international and inter-State relations — the victory of the policy of equality between states and non-interference in the affairs of other countries.

That such phenomena are beginning to appear was evident from the cessation of the war in Viet-Nam which, after the Korean truce, was the second similar event, and new similar phenomena are eagerly awaited by the world. It should be said here once more: regardless of the motives, the very fact that there have been such indications is a proof that certain changes have actually occurred, while the events of the last few months confirm that others may be expected.

Exhausted by the cold war, the world would greet with the greatest approval such events as would strengthen the confidence of humanity.

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PARLIAMENTARY LIFE

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THE NEW JUDICATURE ACTS

THE Federal People's Assembly this year introduced extensive changes in the legislation concerning judiciary in this country. In June it enacted new laws on regular and economic courts. And at the end of October it passed two more laws in this field: the Law on Military Courts, and the Law on Public Prosecution. Indeed, a reform of the juridical system and the penal code in Yugoslavia began some years ago, and the most important acts in the process were the enacting of the new Criminal Code (1950) and the passing of the Law on Criminal Procedure (1953). Before this reform is completed, it will be necessary to enact several more laws. For in civil law cases the courts still act in accordance with the pre-war regulations (this is the only field in which old laws are still valid). As a result, an entirely new code of civil procedure will have to be enacted (regardless of the fact that this may necessitate the promulgation of more than one law). Similarly, the old law on legal practice will also have to be replaced by a new one. The same applies to the old laws on the functions of public attorneys, on offenses, and to some other legal regulations.

The enactment of new judiciary laws became an indispensable necessity after the Federal Constitutional Law of January 1953 came in force. This law, in fact, was a new Constitution of Yugoslavia, under which the social, political, and administrative order is based on a number of new principles, which differ from those proclaimed in the Constitution of 1946. The new juridical laws now establish full harmony between the juridical institutions — courts, public prosecution and others — and the new Constitutional Law. They elaborate and develop the constitutional principles in this important field of the country's administrative and political life. Changes in the organization and practice of the juridical organs and institutions have been taking place since 1950, so that new acts have been superseding the old legal provisions of the Constitution and other legislative acts from the first post-war phase of Yugoslavia's social, political and juridical development (1946—1950).

The two recently adopted laws were only a step further in this process.

The Law on Military Courts supersedes the previous law which was enacted in 1947. It elaborates still further the principles established by the Federal Law on Juridical Organs of June 1954, the first part of which can be considered as a constitutional law as far as the juridical system is concerned. The basic principle of this law, which is of a constitutional character, relates to the integrity of the juridical system. Only regular courts exist in Yugoslavia; our system does not recognize extraordinary courts. Accordingly, the military courts, too, are regular courts, which are authorized to try all criminal offences committed by members of the army. The new law also states what other matters come within the jurisdiction of the military courts. Now, all military courts are included in the regular juridical system for two reasons: firstly, because they,

like all other courts, are responsible for their work to the Federal Supreme Court; secondly, because they are constituted on the same principles as general and economic courts. These principles are as follows: a) courts act in accordance with the law, and are independent in meting out justice; b) they, as a rule, hold hearings in councils composed of permanent and temporary judges, who enjoy equal rights in the proceedings; c) appeal is allowed against all decisions of lower courts, which usually try cases in the first instance; d) all citizens are equal before the law and the courts.

The Law on Military Courts provides for certain deviations from the general constitutional principles. While in other courts certain minor cases can be tried by individual judges, military courts always hear cases in council. In general high courts, the councils are composed of permanent judges; in military courts all cases are tried by temporary judges.

The most important matter regulated by the new law is the jurisdiction of military courts. In this respect the law does not make any significant changes, but it states precisely what cases such courts may and may not try. Military courts are constituted as criminal law courts, whose jurisdiction extends over criminal offences committed by military personnel. They may also try certain specified crimes committed by non-military persons, but only if such crimes are directed against the security of the armed forces. In addition, the Yugoslav military courts have a special jurisdiction over: a) claims for the compensation of damages done to State property by military personnel and civilians on military service while on official duty; b) suits for the recovery of funds the State might have had to pay as a result of illegal work by such persons; c) petitions against administrative acts of military organs. The first of these functions military courts have also exercised earlier, since it is conditioned by the special civil rights and duties of persons on military service. In this way cases involving military personnel are settled in a much more satisfactory manner than it would be possible to do under the general rules which are applied in other courts. The right to settle administrative disputes has been granted to military courts by the new law. The importance of this step lies in the fact that military courts are more familiar with the structure and work of military organs and with the regulations under which they act. However, the law does not give an exclusive right in this respect to the Supreme Military Court, which is empowered to try cases of this kind in the first instance. In order to ensure a uniform application of legal provisions and to protect the citizens' rights, the Law on Military Courts contains provisions which allow the defendants to appeal against all decisions of military courts to a general court. That court is the Federal Supreme Court.

The diagram is a comprehensive organizational chart of the Federal Government of the United States. At the top, it shows the 'THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES' and 'THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES' (divided into 'THE SENATE' and 'THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES'). Below them is 'THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH', which includes 'THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE', 'THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE', 'THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR', 'THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE', 'THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE', 'THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR', 'THE DEPARTMENT OF WAR', 'THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY', 'THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY', and 'THE DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE'. To the right, it lists 'THE JUDICIAL BRANCH' (including 'THE SUPREME COURT' and 'THE FEDERAL COURTS') and 'THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH' (including 'THE SENATE' and 'THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES'). The bottom section details 'THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT' and 'THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT', listing various offices and committees within each. The chart uses a combination of boxes and circles to represent different types of entities and their relationships.

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graph TD
    President[THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES] --- ExecutiveBranch[THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH]
    Congress[THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES] --- LegislativeBranch[THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH]
    Senate[THE SENATE] --- LegislativeBranch
    House[THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES] --- LegislativeBranch
    ExecutiveBranch --- State[THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE]
    ExecutiveBranch --- Justice[THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE]
    ExecutiveBranch --- Interior[THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR]
    ExecutiveBranch --- Agriculture[THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE]
    ExecutiveBranch --- Commerce[THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE]
    ExecutiveBranch --- Labor[THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR]
    ExecutiveBranch --- War[THE DEPARTMENT OF WAR]
    ExecutiveBranch --- Navy[THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY]
    ExecutiveBranch --- Army[THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY]
    ExecutiveBranch --- AirForce[THE DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE]
    ExecutiveBranch --- JudicialBranch[THE JUDICIAL BRANCH]
    ExecutiveBranch --- LegislativeBranch
    LegislativeBranch --- SupremeCourt[THE SUPREME COURT]
    LegislativeBranch --- FederalCourts[THE FEDERAL COURTS]
    ExecutiveBranch --- ExecutiveDepartment[THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT]
    ExecutiveBranch --- LegislativeDepartment[THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT]
    ExecutiveDepartment --- State[THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE]
    ExecutiveDepartment --- Justice[THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE]
    ExecutiveDepartment --- Interior[THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR]
    ExecutiveDepartment --- Agriculture[THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE]
    ExecutiveDepartment --- Commerce[THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE]
    ExecutiveDepartment --- Labor[THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR]
    ExecutiveDepartment --- War[THE DEPARTMENT OF WAR]
    ExecutiveDepartment --- Navy[THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY]
    ExecutiveDepartment --- Army[THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY]
    ExecutiveDepartment --- AirForce[THE DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE]
    LegislativeDepartment --- Senate[THE SENATE]
    LegislativeDepartment --- House[THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES]
    
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[illegible]

Other provisions of the Law on Military Courts regarding the court procedure, the rights and duties of judges, their election and recall, the technical personnel in courts and the like, are, on the whole, identical with the regulations which apply to all other courts. The only difference in this respect is that judges on military courts are appointed and recalled by the Supreme Commander.

The institution of public prosecution in new Yugoslavia originated in the War of Liberation. It was first legally established by a law enacted at the beginning of 1945 and amended in 1946. Under this law public prosecutors were responsible for the correct application of the law, and their duty was to exercise control in that field. Public prosecutors were „specific organs of the People's Assembly for the protection of legality". In the first post-war years, when the revolutionary government was being consolidated and the new social order and State administration organized, they were indispensable organs, and they carried out a number of important tasks in the strengthening of legality and of the new State.

However, the functions of the public prosecutors have been changing together with the social, administrative and legal changes in the country. Under the new Code of Criminal Procedure the prosecutors appear before the court as a party. For with the introduction of the right of contestation (1952), the citizens acquired the right to attack administrative acts which violate their rights. Furthermore, after the self-governing people's committees, the self-governing institutions and organizations were consolidated, and after fundamental changes were carried out in the economic system, it was no longer necessary to control their work. As prescribed by the Constitutional Law of 1953, the Federal Public Prosecutor is appointed by the Federal Executive Council, and is no longer a direct organ of the Assembly.

All these changes had a considerable effect on the powers and the scope of the functions of the public prosecutors. The new Law on Public Prosecution sanctions these changes, and prescribes new duties and rights for public prosecutors.

Now public prosecutors are organs with a definite place in the broader juridical system. They are independent of all organs save the Federal and Republican Executive Councils, from which they receive instructions as to their work. In view of this, they are also, in a sense, administrative organs.

The basic duty of the prosecutors, which at the same time justifies their existence, is to sue the persons who commit criminal acts and economic offences. Under the economic laws enacted at the end of last year and at the beginning of this year, the right to sue the perpetrators of economic offences was exercised by the public attorneys. But this is a function of general importance, and the public attorneys are, in fact, only legal counsels of the districts, Republics and of the Federation. Therefore, the transfer of this right to the public prosecutors is fully justified, for the power to sue those who commit criminal acts is concentrated solely in the hands of the organs who are most qualified to do so. For the same reason the previous right of the public attorneys to file petitions against administrative acts which violate the interests of the community is now also exercised by the public prosecutors.

Other functions of the public prosecutors are of an entirely different kind. They are empowered to ask, under specified conditions, the competent State organs to exercise their rights in supervising the legality of the regulations issued by the people's committees. In addition the public prosecutors have the right to warn all self-governing institutions and enterprises if they violate the law or fail to perform their duties. They draw the attention of the competent State organs, which are authorized to supervise the work of such institutions, to matters of this kind. Furthermore, the law taking in account the social character of public property, and considering that in the socialist social order, the legal rights of persons and institutions impose corresponding obligations on them — authorizes the prosecutors to use certain legal instruments (appeals, petitions, warrants to execute orders and the like) in order to protect public property. But the prosecutor cannot exercise this right without the prior approval of the people's committee, which is the highest organ of authority in the local community.

The new law did not introduce any essential changes in the organization of the system of public prosecution. The whole system is still based on the responsibility of lower to higher prosecutors. What the law changed was the competence in nominating prosecutors. Now the Federal Public Prosecutor appoints the Republican Prosecutors in agreement with the Republican Executive Councils. And the Republican Prosecutors in turn appoint regional and district prosecutors, also with the approval of the Republican Executive Councils. But all public prosecutors act as individual organs. The law also regulates the functions of deputy prosecutors, who are empowered to exercise the same rights as prosecutors without any special authorization. Higher prosecutors can issue instructions and orders to lower prosecutors, which they must carry out. Such instructions and orders may concern any individual matter. In addition the higher prosecutors can perform all duties and exercise all rights of the lower prosecutors.

As far as the qualifications of the public prosecutors are concerned, they must be jurists of the same standing as the judges of corresponding courts.

The Law on Public Prosecution establishes a firm and definite basis for the work of the public prosecutors. For the public prosecutors are still indispensable in this phase of the economic, political and administrative development of Yugoslavia. They are still important organs of the juridical mechanism. Their work is determined by the law and controlled by the People's Assembly through its executive organ — the Executive Council. The further social, political and cultural development of the country, and the material and ideological progress of socialist democracy, will, undoubtedly necessitate new forms in the organization of the institution of public prosecution. And its own development will link it still more with the law courts. The new law emphasized the juridical character of this institution, which is a component part of the State machinery and endeavours to set it on a basis corresponding to the constitutional principles and to the needs of the political and social order in Yugoslav socialist democracy.

ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

Dr Rihard LANG
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THE ECONOMISTS AND COOPERATION IN THE BALKANS

THE general development of the relations between the three allied Balkan countries — Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia — on the basis of the Ankara and Balkan Agreements presents a number of specific characteristics. Their cooperation is developing on a regional basis; the very fact that these three countries are situated in continuous geographic area provides a very wide framework for the development of mutual economic relations. It is of great significance that these countries have resolved that the purpose of their cooperation should be the attainment of such aims as are enunciated in the UN Charter. In considering the Balkan Alliance, it is certainly important to remember that its members are economically less developed than the majority of European countries; according to modern criterions used for the estimation of the degree of economic development, they may be even considered as under-developed countries. Whatever is the significance of these characteristics for the Balkan Alliance, they do not fully describe the specific character of the cooperation between the three Balkan countries. The Balkan Pact is an alliance between countries with different social and economic systems. The Balkan Alliance is really an example of active coexistence between countries with different systems. The great possibilities for regional cooperation between countries with different systems, which would be based on principles similar to those which are underlying the Balkan Alliance, were clearly pointed out at the Conference of representatives of economic associations of Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey held last month in Salonika, under a decision taken during the first talks between Greek and Yugoslav economists in Athens in the first half of 1954.

The low level of development of the productive forces of the Balkan Pact countries and the importance of stepping-up the economic development of this area has been for some time past attracting the attention of economists because of the importance of this part of the world for European economy, and of the harmful effects resulting from its backwardness. These problems began to be studied during the Second World War, while the study of the problems concerning the measures likely to stimulate the economic development in Eastern and South-East Europe is the first example of a survey, made on a regional basis, of the economic development of an area consisting of several countries. In fact, at the beginning of 1943, a group of economists and technicians, gathered in Chatham House, London, began to study the possibility of promoting the economic development of Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Greece, Bulgaria, Rumania and Yugoslavia.¹⁾

The United Nations European Economic Commission was also interested in the economic development of under-developed countries in Europe. This Commission asked its secretariat to prepare a study on the existing possibilities for expanding and accelerating the economic development of the less developed countries in Southern Europe. Accordingly a special „Study of Economic Development in Sou-

thern Europe" was published early in 1954 as a supplement to the „Economic Survey of Europe in 1953". It includes Turkey, Greece, Yugoslavia, Southern Italy, Spain and Portugal. At present a group of experts from South-Eastern Europe are working in Geneva on a report to be submitted to the tenth session of the European Economic Commission concerning the measures to be taken for promoting the economic development of the countries in South-Eastern Europe. Of course, the economists of Turkey, Yugoslavia and Greece in Salonika focussed their attention on the economic development of the Balkan countries. The above mentioned Study of the Economic Development in Southern Europe already underlines the various possibilities for intensifying the economic development of these countries by expanding their cooperation. However, much broader possibilities for the study of this problem are offered by the joint work of the economists of the three Balkan countries.

In Salonika, the economists discussed the economic situation of Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey. They considered the achievements and difficulties of the economies of these three countries which primarily reflect their backwardness. Various common difficulties, resulting from this situation — deficit of the balance of payment, agricultural over-population, economic disproportion, etc., confront these countries with a common problem — what is the best way to ensure a quicker and more harmonious general economic development of industry and agriculture. Full unanimity was reached in the views concerning this problem, taking due account of the specific conditions prevailing in each country.

One thing is common to all three members of the Balkan Alliance: all of them, although not to the same degree nor in the same direction, possess great possibilities for economic development. The numerous and considerable resources of these countries have not yet been adequately exploited. The participants of the Salonika Conference considered various ways and means for increasing mutual economic relations, which could contribute to a considerable extent to the development of their economies. After a detailed examination of this problem, they came to the conclusion that Balkan countries, largely due to the achievements already attained in the field of economic development, provide facilities for reciprocal assistance in their economic development. The future economic development of the Balkan Pact countries and the resulting structural changes, will stress further the complementary character of these economies. That is why it is in the interest of each of these countries, as well as in their common interest, to accelerate the rate of their economic development through individual and joint measures. The expansion of the economy of the

¹⁾ The results of these studies have been described by Dr. P. N. Rosenstein-Boden (Problems of Industrialization of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, The Economic Journal, June-September 1943) and A. L. Minks — The Economic Development of Eastern Europe, International Affairs.

Balkan countries is important also for other European countries, as well as for the whole European economy as part of world economy.

The meeting in Salonika examined various possibilities for expanding the cooperation between the Balkan Alliance countries. The starting point was their existing economic structure, and the eventual changes which will be the result of a rapid development. The talks conducted between the economists have shown that realistic bases for a general expansion of such cooperation already exist, under present conditions, and that further development will create significant new opportunities.

The position of Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia within the framework of European economy was examined for each country, in the light of modern tendencies — towards greater convertibility and multilateralism. When examining their relations with other countries, it must always be borne in mind that the level of their economic development is lower than in most of the other European countries. It is this circumstance which gives a specific character to these economically under-developed countries, since they are very closely linked with countries having a more developed economy. This distinguishes them from many other underdeveloped countries.

It goes without saying that the problem of the financing of the necessary investments cropped up during the discussion — namely, a problem which is the concern of all countries where endeavours are being made to accelerate economic development. Various interesting ideas were set forth concerning mutual cooperation between members of the Balkan Alliance in this regard, and it was decided that the economists of the three countries should make a detailed study of the financing of investments from various sources and examine all the possibilities.

The talks of the economists in Salonika, which were quite satisfactory have proved the possibility and need for the development of a multilateral economic cooperation between the three Balkan countries, and it was decided that the associations of economists should make a comprehensive analysis of all matters connected with it. The significance

and importance of this work is precisely the reason why the representatives of the various associations of economists decided to hold regular meetings devoted to a systematic joint study of various aspects of inter-Balkan economic cooperation.

The basis of this work will be studies on the structure of economy, which the economists of each member-country of the Balkan Alliance will prepare for their respective countries. These studies will survey production, national income, employment, public finances, balance of payment investments etc. In addition, Yugoslav economists will prepare a study on trade between the three countries and possibilities for its expansion. The economists of Greece will prepare a study on the position of members of the Triple Alliance on the world market and the measures likely to improve such position, while the Turkish economists will study the problem of financing the economic development taking into consideration the specific conditions prevailing in the three Balkan countries as well as the general situation and present tendencies in the world. These studies, together with those on the structure of the economies of Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia, will be published after being examined at the next meeting of the economists which will be held in Istanbul in May 1955. This work will be an interesting attempt in studying the acceleration of economic development through the joint activity of underdeveloped countries in a definite area. The studies on regional cooperation will help the Balkan Alliance countries and will perhaps be interesting also, as a form of development of cooperation in a definite area, for other parts of the world which have similar problems.

The conference of economists held in Salonika has revealed the great possibilities of development of economic cooperation, which result from the new atmosphere created in the Balkans by the signing of the Ankara and Balkan agreements. The further activity of the economists will certainly greatly contribute to the implementation, on a large scale, of these agreements, which are equally in the interest of Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey, as well as in the interest of all those who are anxious for peaceful cooperation among nations.

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YUGOSLAVIA ON NEW MARKETS

THE markets of Greece, Turkey, Egypt, the Near, Middle and Far East, Ethiopia and South America are not new in the international exchange of goods. In Yugoslavia, however, these are usually called „new markets”, as they have only recently become a significant factor in Yugoslav foreign trade. A couple of years ago Yugoslavia had not even regular diplomatic relations with many countries in the above mentioned areas, and it was only in 1953 and 1954 that several economic delegations were sent there for the purpose of concluding commercial and payment agreements with the countries in question. These new markets gave a new impetus to Yugoslav trade, and positive results have already been recorded. We shall set forth only a few comparative figures concerning Yugoslav exports to the more important countries of that extensive area in the years 1952, 1953 and in the first half of 1954 — calculated in thousand dinars at the rate of 300 dinars for 1 US dollar:

Country	1952	1953	1-VI-1954
Greece	914,191	1,767,540	1,030,853
Turkey	869,462	6,773,133	3,898,467
Egypt	1,808,028	1,058,375	243,554
Syria	144,852	348,490	261,019
Pakistan	3,091	2,612	9,085
India	31,537	50,318	23,838
Burma	—	319	54,218
Indonesia	5,596	1,441	5,197
Ethiopia	—	14,386	128,669

Argentina	775,600	105,520	467,732
Brazil	496,462	529,036	769,408
Paraguay	38,220	139,291	49,614

The intensive development of economic cooperation on a wider scale is constantly gaining impetus. It is well known that this year Yugoslav enterprises signed with some of these countries important contracts for the execution of investment projects or for the delivery in investment equipment, machines etc. These are under way and only at the end of this year and in 1955 will it be possible to record the data concerning the scope of the exports. To illustrate the favourable prospects which are opening for trade in these markets here are some figures showing the totals of certain contracts concluded between January 1 and November 30, 1954, in thousand dinars:

Country	1-XI-1954
Greece	2,934,517
Turkey	14,697,578
Egypt	744,059
Syria	2,543,162
Pakistan	34,221
India	243,577
Burma	430,962
Indonesia	98,193
Ethiopia	303,304
Argentina	846,898
Brazil	1,786,464
Paraguay	74,685

As will be seen from the above an increase of trade is ensured. The markets have come to know each other, while the businessmen have shown full confidence on the basis of mutual interests. Especially characteristic is the rapid increase of business with Turkey, Greece and Syria. These three countries are linked to Yugoslavia with friendly ties; moreover they are neighbours or almost neighbours and are thus the most natural partners in trade exchange. As regards other countries, the situation is equally favourable despite the distance and the comparatively recent establishment of regular contacts between economic representatives. For Yugoslavia it is of special significance that all these markets are open for her industrial products which are increasingly gaining importance in the general structure of Yugoslav exports. This is the normal result of the constant increase of the Yugoslav industrial production — which has risen during the last two years by 25 per cent, while it succeeded in perfecting the quality and widening the range of its products in a corresponding measure.

But one should not forget that a successful development of economic relations between countries is ensured only if trade and services are reciprocal. The rapid development of Yugoslav industry has created a greater need for import of raw materials and other products which these countries can offer. That is why the delivery of goods from these countries to Yugoslavia is increasing. Cotton, jute, hides, spices, southern fruit, tea, coffee, rice, wheat, oil-yielding plants, copra, scrap iron, manga-

nese ore, natural rubber, teakwood etc. — are only some of the more important products which Yugoslavia purchases in these markets. The volume of imports of these articles into Yugoslavia is of considerable value, and comes approximately to the sum of Yugoslav exports to those areas. True, a large part of the purchases made from these countries is carried out through a third market, which reduces the mutual profit which direct trade brings.

Thus it is not an accident that the Federal Chamber of Foreign Trade as well as groups of Yugoslav producers and exporters are opening technical and commercial offices or sending their representatives to the commercial centres of these countries to organize pavilions in fairs (Salonika, Izmir, Damascus, Karachi, Alexandria, Sao Paulo), which undoubtedly contributes to the study of economic possibilities and to the conclusion of contracts. It is not without reason that ships of the Yugoslav shipping enterprise „Jugolinija“ have been regularly sailing since June this year on the route Rijeka-Hong Kong, calling at important ports on the way, while the Yugoslav PTT service is exerting all its efforts to ensure regular, direct telegraphic and telephonic connexions with many of these countries.

Finally, is it not natural for the Yugoslav economic representatives to do their best to contribute as much as possible to the development of friendly relations with all these countries, based on mutual understanding and common interests?

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